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INTRODUCTION 
The chemotherapy dose required by the 1994 experimental breast 
cancer protocol was already high.  Then, the Dana-Faber Cancer Institute 
administered four times that dosage to Betsy Lehman, the health 
columnist for the Boston Globe.  Lehman died within days.  For two 
months the hospital did not realize that the overdose had caused her 
death.1 
The media coverage was relentless, and its effect was electric.  
People felt that if this horrific botch was possible at Dana-Farber, it was 
possible anywhere.  As one leader in the struggle against medical error 
put it, Betsy Lehman’s death was “Patient Safety’s Chernobyl.”2 
The Lehman tragedy accelerated the recognition that most medical 
errors are (like the Chernobyl meltdown) system errors, not the result of 
a solitary practitioner’s mistake.   
 
 * Of counsel, Bassil & Budreau, Boston, Massachusetts. 
 1. Mark Crane, Who Caused this Tragic Medication Mistake?, MED. ECON. (Oct. 8, 
2001), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/content/who-
caused-tragic-medication-mistake. 
 2. Id. 
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That re-orientation led to action.  Massachusetts moved toward 
building its health system’s capacity for learning—for looking beyond 
blame for tragedies and focusing on preventing recurrence.  The 
Massachusetts Legislature created a state agency,3 the Betsy Lehman 
Patient Safety Center, with the mission of understanding the hidden 
system-based sources of error.  The Lehman Center’s enabling statute 
provides a “safe harbor” where information gathered about patient safety 
events can be protected: statements, documents, and other materials 
provided during participation in the Center’s investigations are not 
available from the Center for use in related civil or administrative 
proceedings.4  The Center provides a platform for “forward-looking 
accountability” aimed at cutting future risk, not at apportioning blame.5 
Now, Massachusetts has seen 30,000 criminal convictions 
overturned after the exposure of faked drug test results supplied by two 
state chemists, Annie Dookhan and Sonja Farak.6  Alone, every faked 
test created the possibility of an extended pretrial detention, a wrongful 
conviction, a prison term, a criminal record, a dismembered family—a 
wrecked life.  Aggregated, the faked tests created a certainty of tens of 
thousands of “wrongful dismissals” and failed prosecutions.  
(Counterfeit drug “false positives” among the 30,000 must have been far 
outnumbered by genuine drug cases that the lab frauds required 
terminating.) 
1. THE SAFETY PERSPECTIVE ON PUBLIC SAFETY 
Criminal justice in the United States is primarily a state and local 
enterprise and most (if not all) states and localities have experienced 
some disturbing outcomes.  Harris County, Texas, for example, has 
experienced its own lab scandals.7  Elsewhere, the innocent are wrongly 
 
 3. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12C, § 15 (2018). 
 4. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12C, § 15(e) (2018).  “The information collected by the 
Lehman center or reported to the Lehman center shall not be a public record as defined in 
section 7 of chapter 4, shall be confidential and shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery 
or introduced into evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding, except as otherwise 
specifically provided by law.”  This provision does not affect the availability of information 
from traditional sources even when it is also submitted to the Center. 
 5. Virginia A. Sharpe, Promoting Patient Safety: An Ethical Basis for Policy 
Deliberation, HASTINGS CTR. REP. S8, S10 (2003), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/patient_safety.pdf. 
 6. Paul Solotaroff, And Justice for None: Inside Biggest Law Enforcement Scandal in 
Massachusetts History, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/did-falsified-drug-tests-lead-to-wrongful-
convictions-w514801. 
 7. See Brian Rogers, Scores of Cases Affected After HPD Crime Lab Analyst Ousted, 
HOUS. CHRON. (June 18, 2014), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-
texas/houston/article/Scores-of-cases-affected-after-HPD-Crime-Lab-5562835.php. 
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convicted while the real perpetrators go free; dangerous prisoners are 
mistakenly released and then kill again; avoidable “suicide-by-cop” 
fatalities traumatize families and frontline police.  Beneath these front-
page spectacles a submerged universe of coerced misdemeanor8 plea 
bargains, protracted pretrial detentions, failed re-entry plans, fruitless 
street stops, “near-misses,” declining “closure rates” and “high 
frequency, low impact” events of all kinds erode public security and trust 
in the law.   
Could these disasters serve as local “Public Safety Chernobyls” and 
lead toward the same forward-looking reforms that followed Betsy 
Lehman’s death?  Can we develop “Criminal Justice Safety Centers” that 
follow the Lehman Center example, and build the capacity—one that is 
now strikingly lacking—to analyze criminal justice disasters 
collaboratively and learn their lessons, insulated from litigation’s 
unpredictable cross-currents of liability, immunity, indemnification, and 
reciprocal blaming?9   
Discussions of contemporary American criminal justice do not 
suffer from any shortage of Models.  Herbert Packer set the ball rolling 
by describing his opposing Crime Control and Due Process Models.10  
John Griffths deployed a Family Model to show that Packer’s two polar 
ideologies are really variant versions of a single, unified Battle Model.11  
In the aftermath of the DNA exoneration cases Innocence Movement 
scholars such as Keith Findley and Marvin Zalman have attempted to 
point out to partisans for one or the other of Packer’s Models that some 
version of a Reliability Model12 or Integrated Justice Model,13 focusing 
on factual accuracy, could present a win/win option that simultaneously 
protects the innocent and targets the actually guilty, whom wrongful 
convictions leave free to find further victims. 
 
 8. See generally Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 171 (2017). 
 9. This not to say that there is not a great deal to be learned from litigation if we pay 
attention. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1055 (2015) [hereinafter Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation]. 
 10. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 150-63 (1968). 
 11. John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third “Model” of the Criminal 
Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 360 (1970).  Like Griffiths, I think that “perspective” more 
accurately expresses what Packer actually delivers than “Model,” but (also like Griffiths) I 
will use “Model” as a way of preserving a measure of continuity in the conversation. 
 12. Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence 
Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133, 147 (2008). 
 13. Marvin Zalman, An Integrated Justice Model of Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L. 
REV. 1465 (2010). See generally Robert J. Norris and Catherine L. Bonventre, Advancing 
Wrongful Conviction Scholarship: Toward New Conceptual Frameworks, 32 JUST. Q. 929 
(2015) (advocating a variety in approaches). 
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Still, there is an embryonic Model that will repay our attention in 
the context of “wrongful acquittals,” wrongful convictions, and other 
less spectacular miscarriages of justice.  It will not function as a blueprint 
for organizing ideological life in the Packer manner, but it can provide a 
reminder that there is another—and potentially paradigm-shifting—way 
of looking at things. 
The last decade has seen a growing interest14 in a criminal justice 
orientation derived from a deep reservoir of literature and experience15 
that high-risk fields such as aviation and medicine16 have tapped to 
develop “cultures of safety.”17  The fact that safety concepts are so easily 
borrowed from other fields probably explains why there have been few 
efforts to denominate an explicit “Safety Model” in criminal justice.18  
But by now it is easy to list books, articles, and compilations that 
introduce the basic safety concepts to criminal justice practice 
 
 14. See generally Douglas Starr, A New Way to Reform the Judicial System, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-root-of-the-
problem [hereinafter Starr, A New Way to Reform the Judicial System]. 
 15. See generally SIDNEY DEKKER, SAFETY DIFFERENTLY (2015); CHARLES PERROW, 
NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984); JAMES REASON, 
HUMAN ERROR (1990) [hereinafter REASON, HUMAN ERROR]; SCOTT SAGAN, THE LIMITS 
OF SAFETY: ORGANIZATIONS, ACCIDENTS, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1993). 
 16. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (2000); 
Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1854 (1994). 
 17. See, e.g., BOAZ SANGERO, SAFETY FROM FALSE CONVICTIONS (2016); JON SHANE, 
LEARNING FROM ERROR IN POLICING: A CASE STUDY IN ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENT 
THEORY (2013); NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENDING JUSTICE: 
SENTINEL EVENT REVIEWS (2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247141.pdf; James 
M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010) [hereinafter Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal 
Justice]; Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, A Safety Doctrine for the Criminal Justice 
System, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV 1293 (2011).  A number of criminologists have encouraged 
further explorations in the safety-minded direction. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The 
Criminology of Wrongful Conviction: A Decade Later, 33 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 82, 100 
(2016). See generally NAT’L INST. OF JUST., NIJ STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: SENTINEL EVENTS INITIATIVE (2017), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250472.pdf. 
As an element of that effort, Scott Hertzberg, a librarian at the National Criminal Justice 
Reference Service, has compiled a bibliography illuminating the extent of an interdisciplinary 
literature that implicates the safety-oriented model. See Sentinel Events Initiative: A Compiled 
Bibliography, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., https://www.nij.gov/topics/justice-
system/Pages/sentinel-events-bibliography.aspx. 
In collaboration with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, NIJ is currently funding technical 
assistance for an array of state and local collaborations that are organizing and evaluating all-
stakeholder “Sentinel Event Learning Reviews.”  This effort to shift focus from blame for past 
miscarriages to cutting the risk of future repetitions is discussed infra notes 106-110 and 
accompanying text. 
 18. But see Boaz Sangero, Safety from Plea-Bargains’ Hazards, 38 PACE L. REV. 301 
(2018) (calling for application of a particular “System-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes” to plea bargain dangers). 
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communities. 19  The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), has given this 
interest practical form through its “Sentinel Events Initiative” by 
conducting a sustained investigation of the potential for mobilizing 
 
 19. Writers on a variety of criminal justice issues have employed the safety concepts.  
For example, forensic science reformers have adopted system-oriented safety thinking. See, 
e.g., PAUL BIEBER, ANATOMY OF A WRONGFUL ARSON CONVICTION: SENTINEL EVENT 
ANALYSIS IN FIRE INVESTIGATION (2017); Itiel Dror & Carolyn Rado, The Bias Snowball and 
the Bias Cascade Effects: Two Distinct Biases that May Impact Forensic Decision-Making, 
62 J. FORENSIC SCI. 832 (2017); Mordechai Halpert & Boaz Sangero, From a Plane Crash to 
the Conviction of an Innocent Man: Why Forensic Science Evidence Should be Inadmissible 
Unless It Has Been Developed as a Safety-Critical System, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 65 (2009); 
Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View of Forensic 
Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1051 (2013); D. Michael Risinger, Whose 
Fault? Daubert, the NAS Report, and the Notion of Error in Forensic Science, 38 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 519 (2010). 
Commentators on policing issues have also utilized the safety lens.  SHANE, supra note 17; 
OFF. OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE 
ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 22, Recommendation 2.3 (2015); John Hollway, Calvin Lee & 
Sean Smoot, Root Cause Analysis: A Tool to Promote Officer Safety and Reduce Officer 
Involved Shootings Over Time, 62 VILL. L. REV. 883 (2017); Joanna C. Schwartz, Systems 
Failures in Policing, 51 SUFFOLK L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, Systems 
Failures in Policing]; Lawrence W. Sherman, Reducing Fatal Police Shootings as System 
Crashes: Research, Theory, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 421 (2018); Douglas Starr, What 
Hospitals Can Teach the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/opinion/sunday/hospitals-police-violence.html. 
Prosecution operations have also been analyzed.  See Josh Cutino, Continuous Quality 
Improvement: Increasing Criminal Prosecution Reliability Through Statewide Systematic 
Improvement Procedures, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065 (2016); James M. Doyle, 
Orwell’s Elephant and the Etiology of Wrongful Convictions, 79 ALB. L. REV. 895 (2015); 
John Hollway, Using Root Cause Analysis to Study Prosecutorial Error: A Collaboration 
between the Montgomery County (Pennsylvania) District Attorney’s Office and the Quattrone 
Center for the Fair Administration of Justice, 62 VILL. L. REV. 13 (2016); Mike Nerheim and 
Meg Reiss, The Criminal Justice System Needs to Start Learning From Its Mistakes, THE HILL 
(Nov. 18, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/360969-the-criminal-justice-
system-needs-to-start-learning-from-its; Boaz Sangero, Safety from Plea-Bargains’ Hazards, 
38 PACE L. REV. 301 (2018). 
Defense performance has also been evaluated on a system safety basis.  See James M. 
Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make?, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 
209 (2012); Eva Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1803-04 (2016). 
The Vera Institute has pursued a safety-oriented approach to jail and prison self-harm events. 
LEAH POPE & AYESHA DELANEY-BRUMSEY, CREATING A CULTURE OF SAFETY: SENTINEL 
EVENT REVIEW OF SUICIDE AND SELF-HARM IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (2016). 
Others have weighed the safety approach in community corrections.  See, e.g., Janet Sheil, 
James Doyle & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Imagining Sentinel Event Reviews in the U.S. 
Probation and Pretrial Services System, 80 FED. PROB. 33 (Sept. 2016). 
At the intersection of criminal justice and its community environment, safety concepts have 
also been mobilized.  See Nicole D. Porter, Expanding Public Safety in the Era of Black Lives 
Matter, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 533 (2016). 
The safety-derived category of “near miss” has been used as a tool for comparing wrongful 
convictions to just outcomes.  Jon B. Gould, Julia Carrano, Richard A. Leo & Katie Hail-
Jares, Predicting Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471 (2014). 
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safety thinking in non-blaming, all-stakeholders, “forward-looking” 
learning reviews after unexpected justice events. 20 
The safety at issue here is everyone’s safety: the safety of crime 
victims, defendants, and communities—even the safety of law 
enforcement personnel21 and legal system practitioners.22 This wider 
safety perspective escapes the zero-sum ideology of the Crime Control 
versus Due Process dialectic in which anything protecting an 
individual’s rights automatically threatens potential crime victims to an 
equal extent.  It recognizes the impact of iatrogenic23 (“from the 
treatment”) injury inflicted by hyper-aggressive “stop, question, and 
frisk” programs, re-traumatizing victim interviews, mass incarceration,24 
and other interventions, and requires that those harms be weighed in the 
balance before making criminal justice choices, not deferred to be 
deplored at some later date.25  It throws a new light on familiar 
challenges; examining events in that light reveals opportunities.  
Familiarity with an emerging Safety Model can improve practice, and 
may fuel transformation.   
At the core of this potential Model is a distinctive etiology—
manner of causation—of errors such as mistaken releases and wrongful 
convictions.26  It discounts single-cause explanations that focus on a lone 
 
 20. See NIJ’s Sentinel Events Initiative, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 
https://www.nij.gov/topics/justice-system/Pages/sentinel-events.aspx.  I have been a 
consultant to this effort, however, the views expressed in this Essay are my own. 
 21. German Lopez, Police Have Known for 45 Years They Shouldn’t Shoot At Moving 
Cars. But They Still Do It., VOX (May 8, 2018) (reporting that the Las Vegas policy, stating 
that the pursuing officer in chase should not be the arresting officer, produced a twenty-three 
percent reduction in the use of force and eleven percent reduction in officer injury, while 
reducing racial disparity). 
 22. Several groups have marshaled the existing safety literature and mobilized it for 
criminal justice purposes.  The National Commission on Forensic Science, which included 
representatives of all implicated communities of practice, adopted a recommendation that 
safety-derived root cause analyses be applied to crime laboratory failures.  See 
Recommendation to the Attorney General Root Cause Analysis (RCA) in Forensic Science, 
NAT’L COMMISSION ON FORENSIC SCI. (Nov. 17, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/file/786581/download; OFFICE OF COMMUNITY 
ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015); The 
Quattrone Center for the For the Fair Administration of Justice 2014 Spring Symposium: A 
Systems Approach to Conviction Integrity (Nov. 17, 2014), 
https://issuu.com/pennlawits/docs/qc_thank_you_book_2014_017496e480b7c9.   
 23. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK 
39 (Winter 1998). 
 24. Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration and Social Inequality, DAEDALUS 8 at 
9 (Summer 2010). 
 25. See generally JAMES FOREMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017). 
 26. See generally James M. Doyle, An Etiology of Wrongful Convictions: Error, Safety, 
and Forward-Looking Accountability in Criminal Justice, in MARVIN ZALMAN & JULIA 
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practitioner (e.g., a lab technician, or trial prosecutor, or ineffective 
defender) or a defective component (e.g., a non-blind lineup or faulty 
forensic technique). 
Safety commentators in aviation, medicine, and other high-risk 
fields would argue that like the space shuttle Challenger launch 
decision,27 a “wrong patient” surgery,28 or the Chernobyl meltdown,29 
wrongful convictions and mistaken releases are system errors: 
“organizational accidents.”  In this conception, miscarriages of justice 
result from small mistakes and decisions—none of which are 
independently sufficient to cause the event—that combine with each 
other and with latent system weaknesses, which only then cause harm.  
This approach applies to a whole range of errors, including the 
unspectacular: “cold cases” that stay cold too long, fruitless stops and 
frisks, avoidable shootings of or by police, distended sentences for trivial 
violations, and “near miss” and “good catch” events where disaster was 
averted at the last moment by special skill or good luck.30   
The safety paradigm, as Richard Leo notes, can: 
Move us beyond individual or single-cause explanations of wrongful 
convictions to more systemic and etiological ones that emphasize 
routine mistakes, feedback loops, reciprocal impacts, interaction 
effects, latent conditions, and cumulative error, among other factors 
to more accurately understand the causes and cures of wrongful 
convictions.31 
To the question “who is accountable?,” safety commentators would 
answer, “everyone involved, to one degree or another, if not by acting 
themselves, then by failing to anticipate or intercept another’s action.”  
“Everyone” in this context includes individuals far from the scene of the 
event who did the hiring and training, set the caseloads, shaped the 
jurisprudence, imposed the budgets, and created the environment for the 
sharp-end actors.  Dr. Lucien Leape, one of the pioneers in the patient 
 
CARRANO, WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 56 
(2014). 
 27. DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, 
CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA (1st ed. 1996). 
 28. Mark R. Chassin & Elise C. Becher, The Wrong Patient, 136 ANNALS OF INTERNAL 
MED. 826, 829 (2002). 
 29. See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK 
TECHNOLOGIES 354 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 30. See Starr, A New Way to Reform the Judicial System, supra note 14 (describing 
Philadelphia “sentinel events” review of homicide in which it was discovered that wrong men 
had been held for six months pretrial).  For a discussion of “near miss” and “good catch” 
approaches in medicine, see Kurt B. Hurzer, et al., Patient Safety Reporting Systems: 
Sustained Quality Improvement Using Multidisciplinary Team and “Good Catch” Awards, 
38 JOINT COMM’N J. QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY 339 (2012). 
 31. Leo, supra note 17, at 97. 
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safety movement, summarized this perspective: “While an operator error 
may be the proximate “cause” of the accident, the root causes were often 
present within the system for a long time.  The operator has, in a real 
sense, been “set up” to fail by poor design, faulty maintenance, or 
erroneous management decisions.”32   
Would we think differently about things if we kept the safety 
perspective in mind? 
2. THE SAFETY PERSPECTIVE AND DIAGNOSING UNSAFE OUTCOMES 
Correcting individual errors (for example, by closing a “cold case” 
or exonerating a prisoner) and addressing prospectively the systemic 
weaknesses leading to those errors are two different tasks.33  The wider 
lens provided by safety thinking advances both of those efforts, although 
in different ways.  The potential impact on identifying past errors is less 
direct and more modest than the impact on preventing future harms, and 
it is felt only one case at a time.  Even so, it is real, and should not be 
ignored. 
The legal system’s treatment of miscarriages of justice—known or 
alleged, completed or looming—traditionally employs a streamlined 
approach to cause and effect.  It isolates a single defective component of 
the system, sometimes human (for example, a prosecutor who hides 
exculpatory evidence, or a technician who “dry labs” an evidence 
sample) and sometimes technical (for example, an unscientific forensic 
technique, or a faulty communications link) and treats it as the cause.34  
That cause determines a definite effect, just as a defective spring or gear 
in the clockwork would dictate failure in a wristwatch. 
 
 32. Leape, supra note 16. 
 33. See generally Keith Findley, Learning From Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice 
Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333 (2002); Kent Roach, 
The Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discovery, Systemic Reform or Both?, 85 CHI. 
KENT L. REV. 89 (2010). 
 34. On general concepts of causation in conventional legal thinking, see, H.L.A. HART 
& TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1985).  For cause-effect reasoning in error 
review, see, Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful 
Conviction Law, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 35.  Safety expert Sidney Dekker draws this contrast 
between legal and modern safety concepts of causation. SIDNEY DEKKER, DRIFT INTO 
FAILURE: FROM HUNTING BROKEN COMPONENTS TO UNDERSTANDING COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
79 (2011) (“The way in which legal reasoning in the wake of accidents separates out one or a 
few actions (or inactions) on the part of individual people follows such reductive logic.  For 
example, the Swedish Supreme Court ruled that if one nurse had more carefully double-
checked a particular medication order before preparing it (mistakenly at ten times the intended 
dose) a three-month-old baby would not have died.  Such condensed, highly focused accounts 
that converge on one (in)action by one person (the “eureka part”) give componential models 
of failure a societal legitimacy that keeps reproducing and instantiating Newtonian physics.”). 
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Media accounts of criminal justice malfunctions reinforce this view 
because they are obsessed with identifying villains (the racist, trigger-
happy cop who shoots the civilian) or fools (the naïve judge who releases 
the murderous juvenile).35  So does the rhetoric of appellate opinions that 
isolate a culpable cause, then gauge its prejudicial effect.  Occasionally, 
when the failures of more than one component (the lab technician and 
then the prosecutor and then the defender) are noticed, the causal 
language in the appellate opinion or news story moves from “simple” to 
“complicated.”  Even in those cases, however, the relationship between 
the “causes” is described as linear and sequential, and the relationship 
between the proximate cause and the harm is seen as determinative:  x 
happened, and so therefore, y followed, and z followed from that.36  This 
“complicated” version can be fully captured by devices such as a 
timeline, a “Fishbone Diagram,”37 or a “Swiss Cheese Diagram.”38 
Contemporary safety writers39 argue that human interaction with 
even a simple system very quickly introduces uncertainty, adaptation, 
and complexity.  Once the humans are involved, cause and effect 
relationships are no longer linear (as in a machine); for every act there 
can be an unlimited number of effects. 40  A jet airliner is an immensely 
complicated machine, but jet air liners in operation “[B]ecome complex 
because they are opened up to influences that lie way beyond 
engineering specifications and reliability predictions.”41 
The production of these effects is not determinate, as throwing a 
switch would be; it is probabilistic.  For example, the decision to use a  
“simultaneous” lineup technique in which the suspect and fillers are 
displayed together may generate more “false hit” identifications of an 
innocent suspect than a “sequential” (one photo at a time) technique, but 
it does not produce a false hit; it raises the odds in favor of one.42  That 
 
 35. See, e.g., Shawn Cohen & Bruce Golding, Gun-Grabbing Nut Wasn’t the Only 
Suspect Judge Released Without Bail, N.Y. POST (July 15, 2017), 
https://nypost.com/2017/07/15/judge-released-alleged-gun-grabber-who-could-have-killed-
everybody/. 
 36. For an example of legal insistence on “but for” causation, see Burrage v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 204 (2014) (drug overdose causation not sufficiently shown). 
 37. How to Use the Fishbone Diagram, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/provider-enrollment-and-
certification/qapi/downloads/fishbonerevised.pdf. 
 38. REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 15. 
 39. See, e.g., Ivan Pupulidy & Crista Vesel, The Learning Review: Adding to the Accident 
Investigation Toolbox, EUR. COMMISSION JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE (Nov. 2017). 
 40. Sidney Dekker, Paul Cilliers & Jan-Hendrik Hofmeyr, The Complexity of Failure: 
Implications of Complexity Theory for Safety Investigations, 49 SAFETY SCI. 939 (2011). 
 41. Id. at 941-42 (emphasis added). 
 42. Nancy K. Steblay, Jennifer E. Dysart & Gary L. Wells, Seventy-Two Tests of the 
Sequential Lineup Superiority Effect: A Meta-Analysis and Policy Discussion, 17 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 99 (2011). 
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false hit may, in turn, increase the probability that “tunnel vision” 
cognitive bias in investigators will be triggered.43  Huge caseloads or 
intense media pressure may increase the likelihood that the tunnel vision 
cognitive bias is augmented and alternative suspects or contradictory 
narratives are disregarded rather than appropriately sought and 
evaluated.   
But these factors will not require those outcomes.  They are 
“influences” rather than “causes” in the routine legal sense.44  They do 
not act in sequence; they are acting together, and on each other, 
simultaneously.  A decision by a cop, or a prosecutor, or a defender, or 
a judge may often seem to be a cause, but it is certainly always an effect: 
every decision is the outcome of the practitioners’ struggles to make 
sense of the swirling influences that are acting on them. The 
practitioner’s situation during patrol, or investigation, or litigation is 
dynamic and adaptive, not static and schematic.  The presence of any 
particular influence does not guarantee failure in every case, nor does its 
absence guarantee safety.  This recognition can help to repair a blind 
spot in the re-evaluations of investigations, prosecutions, convictions, 
and other processes.   
The tight focus on Newtonian scenarios of cause-and-effect 
channels inquiry and investigation, and it can obscure the fact that a 
mistake has been made whenever no single, glaring, independently 
sufficient cause presents itself.  The identification of some “smoking 
gun” cause becomes a triage criterion for the hard-pressed practitioners 
who must investigate and prepare claims:  it is treated as a prerequisite 
not only to a finding of error, but to the commitment of time and 
resources required in looking for one.45  Unless someone can point to a 
distinct violation with an inevitable product, the harm is not likely to be 
recognized in any practical sense.  Adherence to the everyday causation 
model leads quickly to a dead end in investigations of possible 
miscarriages of justice.   
But the safety perspective opens a supplemental window on legally 
significant narratives by explaining how—even without the 
independently sufficient “smoking gun”—slips and errors occur, 
 
 43. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision 
in Criminal Cases, 2 WISC. L. REV. 291, (2006). 
 44. Pupulidy & Vesel, supra note 39 and accompanying text at 1. 
 45. The history of the Innocence Movement, for example, reflects an abiding concern 
with the triage function imposed on innocence lawyers by the scarcity of resources.  See 
generally ROBERT J. NORRIS, EXONERATED: A HISTORY OF THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT, 
188-89 (2017); Daniel S. Medwed, Actual Innocents: Considerations in Selecting Cases for a 
New Innocence Project, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1097 (2002). 
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cascade, and cumulate until an unforeseen result takes its toll. 46  Starting 
from the hypothesis that the result is mistaken with this complex etiology 
in mind can help to imagine a path of “locally rational” but mistaken 
decisions and reveal the likelihood that an error has occurred either in 
convicting or eliminating a suspect.  A “within-policy” wrongful 
conviction or solvable yet still unsolved “cold case” in which everyone 
followed the rules as the rules then stood and took only those risks that 
were regarded as “acceptable” is perfectly possible given the potential 
for human error built into the investigative process and the unreliability 
of the legal system’s diagnostic capabilities.47  Even so, retrospectively 
uncovering individual mistakes is only the beginning of the Safety 
Model’s potential contribution.   
3. THE PREVENTION POTENTIAL IN FORWARD-LOOKING 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
No system can survive without disciplining its conscious rule-
breakers, and enthusiasts for the “non-blaming” approach to safety 
reviews have to keep that fact in mind.48  Certainly, the Massachusetts 
drug lab scandals, for example, make it very clear that there really are 
“bad apples” in the criminal justice system, and that there is nothing 
wrong with dismissing and prosecuting them.49  In fact, public trust in 
the system can depend to an important degree on the punishment of 
insider misconduct.  But those debacles also make it clear that the 
punishment of culpable individuals is a bad place to stop.   
One of the Safety Model’s maxims is that it is insufficient to go 
“down and in” to understand an event; you must also go “up and out” to 
appreciate the environment that motivated the proximate human agent.50 
 
 46. Cf. Ruth A. Moyer, To Err is Human; To Cumulate, Judicious: The Need for U.S. 
Supreme Court Guidance on Whether Federal Habeas Courts Reviewing State Convictions 
May Cumulatively Assess Strickland Errors, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 447 (2012); D. Michael 
Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of 
Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281 (2004). 
 47. DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 
(2012). 
 48. Robert M. Wachter & Peter J. Pronovost, Balancing “No Blame” with Accountability 
in Patient Safety, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401 (2009). 
 49. An extensive body of commentary addresses how (and by whom) the line between 
disciplinary and educational reviews should be drawn as organizations strive to institute a 
“Just Culture” that allows for workers’ participation in addressing safety challenges.  See, e.g., 
SIDNEY DEKKER, JUST CULTURE: BALANCING SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2007); David 
D. Woods, Conflicts Between Learning and Accountability in Patient Safety, 54 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 482 (2005). 
 50. See SIDNEY DEKKER, DRIFT INTO FAILURE: FROM HUNTING BROKEN COMPONENTS 
TO UNDERSTANDING COMPLEX SYSTEMS 130-33 (2011). 
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Standing to the left of Annie Dookhan and Sonja Farak were the 
people who hired them, trained them, supervised them, and devised the 
laboratory evidence handling protocols they blithely skated around.51  
Standing to their right was a legion of lab directors and legal system 
practitioners—prosecutors, defenders, and judges—who failed 
(throughout the disposition of 30,000 cases) to notice that anything was 
amiss.52   
It is easy to see how Dookhan and Farak crippled the work of 
Massachusetts prosecutors and defenders downstream, but it is 
important to remember that their awareness of the ramshackle state of 
the downstream inspection apparatus influenced the upstream choices of 
the two “bad apples.”53  Besides, simultaneously battering all of these 
players was an encompassing environment of acute caseload pressures 
and dire resource shortages that generated the culture of “work-
arounds,” triage, and “covert work rules” that made it both attractive and 
possible for Dookhan and Farak to zig when they should have zagged.54   
Safety experts would say that the criminal justice scandals that 
excite media attention are actually proof that Murphy’s Law is mistaken:  
that everything that could go wrong usually goes right, and that we then 
draw the mistaken conclusion that the absence of visible disaster is proof 
of safety.55 
That insight echoes an observation of Dr. Donald Berwick, one of 
the pioneers of the patient safety movement:  “Every defect a treasure.”56  
Berwick’s contention would be that whether or not there is someone to 
hang after a known miscarriage of justice, there is a great deal that can 
be learned about preventing recurrence:  that there are always many 
important features revealed that would have stayed hidden if the event 
had not exploded.57 
The masked state of these dangers is in the nature of things.  As 
safety expert Sidney Dekker noted: 
…[D]ecisions that are seen as ‘bad decisions’ after the accident 
(even though they seemed like perfectly acceptable ideas at the time) 
are seldom big, risky steps.  Rather, there is a long and steady 
 
 51. Solotaroff, supra note 6. 
 52. In at least two cases involving Assistant Attorneys General who were notified of the 
lab errors, the lawyers allegedly worked to cover up the extent of the problem. Id. 
 53. See Laurin, supra note 19, at 1056-58. 
 54. PERROW, supra note 15, at 9. 
 55. WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, INSIDE THE SKY: A MEDITATION ON FLIGHT, 196 (1998) 
(referencing Charles Perrow). 
 56. Donald Berwick, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Healthcare, 320 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 53, 54 (1989). 
 57. See Leape, supra note 16, at 1855-57 (arguing for medical adaptation of aviation 
causation concepts). 
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progression of small, incremental steps that unwittingly take an 
operation toward its boundaries.  Each step away from the original 
norm that meets with empirical success (and no obvious sacrifice of 
safety) is used as the next basis from which to depart just that little 
bit more.  It is this incrementalism that makes distinguishing the 
abnormal from the normal so difficult.  If the difference between 
what ‘should be done’ (or what was done successfully yesterday) and 
what is done successfully today is minute, then this slight departure 
from an earlier established norm is not worth remarking or reporting 
on.58 
An exclusively disciplinary concentration will drive reports of 
variations further underground.  No one wants to become enmeshed in 
an unpredictable punitive process with potentially disastrous and 
disproportionate impacts on themselves or co-workers.  The Safety 
Model reminds us that frontline operators are rarely driven by 
ideological fealty to Crime Control or Due Process models; they are just 
trying to get through their days, in jobs constructed for them by others.  
The safety that preoccupies them during those days is their own safety.59 
Paradoxically, the events that at first seem most responsive to “Bad 
Apple” analyses provide the clearest illustration of the distinctive 
efficacy of the safety approach.  Take, for example, a trial prosecutor 
concealing evidence of innocence in a wrongful conviction case.60  After 
an exoneration such as that of John Thompson,61 who spent decades on 
death row after a prosecutor hid exculpatory lab tests and withheld 
information about an incentivized witness (who may have been the 
actual killer), our tendency is to react with rage:  to call for prosecution, 
disbarment, or civil damages—exorcise the culprit, and leave it at that.  
Safety Model practice would encourage us to go further.  It distinguishes 
a “performance review” of an individual from an “event review”62 that 
provides a fuller learning platform. 
Why was Thompson chosen in the first place?  The Safety Model 
would prompt us to ask about the multiple failures both in the 
investigation that preceded the Thompson prosecutor’s decision and in 
the adversarial inspection stage that followed it.  The examination will 
 
 58. SIDNEY W.A. DEKKER, LUND UNIV. SCH. OF AVIATION, WHY WE NEED NEW 
ACCIDENT MODELS 6 (2005). 
 59. David D. Woods, Conflicts Between Learning and Accountability in Patient Safety, 
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 482 (2005). 
 60. See generally James M. Doyle, Orwell’s Elephant and the Etiology of Wrongful 
Convictions, 79 ALB. L. REV. 895 (2016). 
 61. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011); JOHN HOLLWAY & RONALD M. 
GAUTHIER, KILLING TIME: AN 18-YEAR ODYSSEY FROM DEATH ROW TO FREEDOM (2010). 
 62. SIDNEY DEKKER, THE SECOND VICTIM: ERROR, GUILT, TRAUMA, AND RESILIENCE 
42 (1st ed. 2013) (quoting Ivan Pupulidy) [hereinafter DEKKER, THE SECOND VICTIM]. 
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reveal valuable new questions in each of these phases.  Did the 
investigation fail in evidence collection, analysis, or evaluation?63 All 
three?  How?  Why?  Was there confirmation bias, tunnel vision, external 
media, or political pressure involved?  Were there training or supervision 
weaknesses?  Crime scene technical incompetence?  Did the defenders 
fail to intercept the mistake and find out about the lab results because of 
funding shortages, caseloads, training issues, grudging discovery rules, 
see-no-evil trial judges, or individual lethargy? 
For a modern safety analyst, the prosecutor’s personal character 
would not provide a satisfying answer to the question of how to prevent 
another Thompson case.  Research indicates that ethical conduct is not 
stable either within or across individuals; it is malleable and dynamic, 
affected by circumstances. 64  Stating ethical principles in a manual is not 
sufficient.  Having ethical principles and applying those ethical 
principles are two different things, and there is an entire field of 
Behavioral Ethics65 available to help us probe what environmental 
features affected this prosecutor and might affect the next young 
prosecutor who weighs discovery obligations.   
What levers in the prosecutor’s environment influenced his 
behavior?  The relative unlikelihood of discipline was probably one, but 
was it the only one?  An absence of training?  A straitened focus on 
conviction rates as the only measure of performance?  Pressure from 
superiors or the media to deliver those “outputs”?  What were the 
impacts of the need to persuade jurors to convict (or defendants to plead) 
on the cognitive frame the prosecutor employed?66  Did the prosecutors’ 
office culture generate informal “counterfactuals” (“He could have been 
guilty”) that lessened the ethical price in the eyes of the prosecutor’s 
peers?67  Had withholding more and more exculpatory evidence in 
weaker and weaker cases become, by small increments, more and more 
normal? 
 
 63. See generally KIM ROSSMO, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE FAILURES (2009). 
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Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999 (2009). 
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When a Presidential Commission examined the tragic space shuttle 
Challenger launch decision it concluded that NASA managers and 
engineers had deviated from safety rules in order to meet a launch 
schedule dictated by political and budgetary pressures—in other words, 
the Commission placed the blame on individuals’ moral and ethical 
laxity.68  But when Diane Vaughan looked more closely at the tragedy 
from a safety perspective she demonstrated that “[i]t was conformity, not 
deviation, that caused the disaster”;69  that the Challenger story was one 
of “incremental descent into poor judgment.”70  Everyone did pretty 
much what they thought they were expected to do:  they accepted the 
organizational “acceptable risks.”71  The launch decision was “[A] 
mistake embedded in the banality of organizational life.”72 
A Safety Model assessment of the Thompson exoneration would 
not evade the fact that there was individual misconduct, but it would also 
ask whether John Thompson was the victim not only of a rogue 
prosecutor but of a criminal justice system that had replicated, in its own 
way, the culture of “structural secrecy” that Vaughan argued 
characterized NASA—a culture that kept secrets from itself, and 
produced a tragedy that no one wanted.73  Is this a system that can be 
expected to do the same thing again? 
The capacity of the Safety lens to reveal additional weaknesses at 
both the component level and system level can also be applied across the 
whole spectrum of iatrogenic harms flowing from police-citizen 
encounters that are usually understood (when they are examined at all) 
through a tightly focused assessment of the performance of the officer at 
the sharp end.  There are police shootings in which the racial bias, 
explicit or implicit, of the officer who pulls the trigger is a glaring 
factor.74  There are other events where an officer, actively menaced by 
an armed and mentally ill citizen who was bent on “suicide-by-cop,” had 
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no choice except to shoot.75  There are “high frequency, low impact” 
events such as fruitless stops and frisks that humiliate law-abiding 
citizens.76  When examined from a safety perspective with the goal of 
preventing recurrence, these familiar scenarios are not simple. 
Even when a shooting is perpetrated by a racist cop there are safety 
questions remaining about the system’s hiring, training, and supervision 
components.77  Could he have been screened out?  Were red flags missed 
during his career or in his off-duty life?  Even assuming the cop was a 
racist, why did he shoot this time, but not the hundreds of other times 
when his racism would have been operating?  Safety practice would 
distinguish the performance review of the individual from the event 
review that accounts for the confluent and cascading system influences 
that led to the death, and that might lead to another in the future. 
Did the encounter have to occur in the first place?  Studies show 
that traffic stops for equipment violations are heavily biased along racial 
lines.78  They are dangerous to civilians (and, disproportionately to 
minority civilians) and they are dangerous to officers too. 79  So why do 
we insist at the department level on a practice of equipment violation 
stops when notice-to-owner programs could achieve similar results?  
Could everyone’s safety be enhanced if the number of these events is 
reduced? 
In safety terms, understanding a fatal police shooting of an acutely 
mentally ill citizen does not begin and end with the officer’s final 
decision to fire, but pursues the etiological question of why these two 
individuals, in these mental states, and with this training, treatment, and 
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equipment influencing them, met on this occasion.80  What was the 
history of the deceased?  How was the continuity of his treatment 
managed?  What was the training of the officer?  Of the dispatcher who 
sent him?  Was the officer equipped with and trained in de-escalation 
and non-lethal options?  Did the Department have a Crisis Intervention 
capability?  Did fatigue, augmented by Departmental shift-work 
arrangements, affect the officer’s decision-making?81  Would any of 
these things, done differently, have produced a different result? 
Further along the spectrum, a street stop-and-frisk of a blameless 
citizen on his or her way to work is a harm that could be analyzed if 
safety is what we have in mind.  Assessing that coercive interaction 
purely on the basis of the decision of the cop who makes the stop is in 
safety terms radically incomplete.  What factors combined to create this 
“high frequency low impact” harm?  What influenced the decision?  
What departmental policy or practice shaped the street cop’s prediction 
that he would find something if he stopped the citizen?  Or convinced 
him that it didn’t really matter very much whether he found something 
on this citizen or not:  that any harm would be trivial?82  Was the officer 
impacted by a CompStat quota that misused (or failed entirely to use) 
geo-spatial predictive resources? 
The Safety Model also encourages us to see that the most obvious 
victims of miscarriages of justice are not the only victims.  Certainly, 
John Thompson was a victim of a wrongful conviction, but his wrongful 
conviction harmed others too.  The real murderer may have found further 
victims while Thompson served his time.  Thompson’s family was 
victimized; his conviction cheated the murder victim’s family of 
whatever solace a just outcome would have provided, and the revelation 
of the miscarriage re-traumatized the family.  Thompson’s overmatched 
appointed defenders should certainly—like the NICU nurse who is the 
last person in the chain of delivery of the fatal overdose to an infant—be 
regarded as “second victims,”83 wounded by learning that they had failed 
to protect an innocent man from a death sentence.   
A police officer who lives to walk away from the fatal shooting of 
a mentally ill citizen doesn’t walk away unharmed, no matter how 
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“within policy” the shooting might have been.  The existential terror of 
the encounter, the trauma of the shooting, the legal jeopardy the shooting 
created, will all leave enduring wounds. 84 
The Safety Model captures intergenerational and community harms 
generated by criminal justice choices that are ordinarily not accounted 
for in the analysis of events.85  The safety perspective comprehends that 
criminal justice is, as Angela Harris put it, “environmental justice,”86 and 
takes account of the radiating collateral damage the system produces.87 
The Safety Model imports from industrial and medical practice a 
number of tested techniques (e.g., Root Cause Analysis, “Fishbone” 
diagrams, “Five Why” inquiries) that will improve the quantity of faulty 
components exposed and will also offer a new degree of precision in 
describing them.88  It is virtually certain that by applying these tools the 
Safety Model approach will uncover multiple defects and that those 
defects will be present across many jurisdictions.  We can have a more 
comprehensive catalog of component weaknesses and sites of harm—a 
longer “to-do” list of useful repairs.  The Safety Model can improve 
practice incrementally in this way.  A “Library,”89 or “Clearinghouse,”90 
or “Database”91 sharing reports of learning events can be an extremely 
useful resource. 
But it would be a mistake to allow the multiplied insights these tools 
produce to be treated as the end product.  The Safety Model warns that 
a preemptive focus on optimizing individual components provides a 
poor route to overall system safety.92  A Root Cause Analysis “[T]oo 
often results in a simple linear narrative that displaces more complex, 
and potentially fruitful, accounts of multiple and interacting 
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contributions to how events really unfold.”93  Any “fix” we generate this 
way will be subject to attack from its environment.  Caseloads will rise, 
budgets will fall.  Our “fix” will impact distant elements of the system 
in unanticipated ways, and adjustments made at those sites will then 
affect our site in turn.  Inevitably, triage, “workarounds,” and “covert 
work rules” will multiply on the frontlines.  Safety specialists recognize 
that we will need a new “fix” tomorrow, and then another fix on the day 
after that.94 
Criminal justice is an environment where nothing can really be 
“fixed” within an organizational silo, no matter how precise in 
technocratic terms its internal Root Cause Analysis or Fishbone Diagram 
may be.  When (as in Camden, New Jersey) sixty-seven percent of the 
people who are arrested and involved in the criminal justice system also 
cycle through hospital emergency departments, it is not really possible 
to say which system is “upstream” and which is “downstream;” each is 
both upstream and downstream of the other.95  Both are buffeted by 
external forces derived from budgets, drug epidemics, housing 
shortages, and economic disasters.96 
Ultimately, safety (and its opposite) can no more be seen in a single 
component than “wetness” can be seen in a single molecule of H2O.  
Safety is an emergent quality that must be sought on the system level, 
and safety is not finally generated by discrete “fixes” to components in 
themselves, but by the cultivation and maintenance of a culture of 
continuous improvement.97 Resiliency, not the permanent “fix,” is the 
Safety Model’s goal. 
4. PARTICIPATION, COLLABORATION, RESTORATION 
In the final paragraph of his magisterial The Collapse of American 
Criminal Justice, William Stuntz argued that: 
The criminals we incarcerate are not some alien enemy.  Nor, for that 
matter, are the police officers and prosecutors who seek to fight 
crime in those criminals’ neighborhoods.  Neither side of this divide 
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is “them.”  Both sides are us.  Democracy and justice alike depend 
on getting that most basic principle of human relations right.98 
For fifty years academic debate about the relative merits of Herbert 
Packer’s Crime Control and Due Process Models99 has rested 
comfortably atop a criminal justice discourse that takes for granted the 
divided society Stuntz decries.  Crime Control Model partisans argue for 
more expansive state control over citizens; Due Process Model 
advocates call for greater control over state power.100  The conversation 
is carried on along lines—the argument over Blackstone’s ratio of nine 
guilty going free being better than one innocent convicted101 is one good 
example—that would be familiar to John Stuart Mill and the early 
English Utilitarians who were (not coincidentally) occupied during their 
official careers with administering the government of a subordinate 
people in distant colonial India.102  Contemporary popular news and 
entertainment media are saturated by a vision of inner cities as exotic 
places:  as a There seemingly as distant from Here as Bombay from 
London—Hearts of Darkness, inhabited by an intrinsically different 
population of fulltime predators and their fulltime prey.103  Policies 
institutionalizing the biased division of housing104 and wealth creation105 
by race have given concrete form to this vision.  Ordinary white 
Americans never visit the inner cities, but they are perfectly certain of 
what they would find if they did visit.106 
These factors have mutually nourished each other, and their 
synergetic effects have both instigated and been augmented by criminal 
justice system practices leading to the profligate distribution of criminal 
histories, pretrial detentions, and mass incarceration.107  A “[r]igidly 
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binomial opposition of ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’ ” 108 dominates this thinking, 
and a ratcheting effect takes hold, driving the authorities and the 
communities further apart.  The conversation sinks to a level at which 
the question is defined as whether Black Lives Matter or whether Blue 
Lives Matter, as if the two were mutually exclusive.109  Remembering 
the Safety Model perspective could offer us a way out of this trap.   
To begin with, the safety perspective suggests that the fascination 
with control that animates the Crime Control and Due Process 
antagonists entangled in Packer’s Battle Model is a detour.110  Control 
may be a means to an end, but it is not an end in itself, and control (like 
safety itself) is at best evanescent, always fragile, and at times 
completely illusory.111  In a racially and economically divided society, 
the blind pursuit of control for its own sake or as if it were the 
indispensable precondition to progress in any direction comes at a price, 
and it has proven destructive.   
John Griffiths argued that Herbert Packer’s Crime Control and Due 
Process Models were not really the polar opposites that Packer claimed, 
but were variant versions of a single “Battle Model,” both predicated on 
a zero-sum contest carried out between an irreconcilable state and 
individual:  an inevitable war in which one side wins, and one side 
loses.112  To make his point Griffiths conjured up a contrasting “Family 
Model” derived from another institution in society that regularly hands 
out discipline and punishment but is built on a foundation of love and an 
assumption that the offending child and the disciplinarian parent will 
ultimately reconcile.113   
Griffiths also recounted the failed effort of the early juvenile justice 
reform movement to treat delinquency prosecutions as exercises in 
pursuing the best interests of the child:  “the closest thing to a Family 
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Model idea we have ever had in this country.”114  The juvenile court 
reform movement of the early twentieth century collapsed, Griffiths 
concluded, because “it was an idea imposed artificially upon an 
unchanged Battle Model substratum . . . A rhetorical abstraction of love 
was superimposed upon a reality of indifference, hostility, and 
ostracism.”115 The movement’s result was a juvenile process that was 
simply the criminal process minus protections for the accused.116 
It might seem that a similar doom awaits any attempt at realizing a 
Safety Model in criminal justice.  But although the Safety Model and the 
Family Model confront the same Battle Model culture, they encounter it 
from radically different angles.  To begin with, the Safety Model’s own 
central logic makes it clear that the Safety Model could never be imposed 
on frontline culture from on high (in the manner in which Griffiths’ 
“Family Model” of juvenile justice was imposed) in the first place.117  
The “culture of safety” that the Safety Model sketched in this Essay 
requires is by its nature collaborative and diverse:  involving all-
stakeholders (at all ranks) and their array of perspectives.  It is informed 
of current knowledge in the implicated fields, promotes the reporting of 
errors and “near misses,” creates an atmosphere of trust for frontline 
workers, remains flexible in adapting to changing demands, and is 
willing and able to learn about the functioning of its own safety 
system.118   
The Safety Model constitutes a wager on the frontline troops—it 
sees them as a resource, not as a menace. 119  It recognizes that the local 
motivations for practitioners’ “workarounds” and “practical drift”—
influences that would be repudiated as “excuses” in any retrospective 
disciplinary process—are an indispensable element of any forward-
looking inquiry aimed at preventing future harms.  Safety must be “co-
produced” by the officials and the communities working together to 
identify harms or it won’t be produced at all, and it requires an 
understanding of the perspectives of all ranks, in all stakeholder roles.  
Just as the patient safety version of analyzing events includes the 
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patient’s family and the operating room nurse as well as the Chief of 
Surgery, the public safety incarnation must value the community and 
patrol officer perspectives as well as those of the Assistant 
Commissioner and the Chief Judge. 
Besides, the Safety Model’s interaction with the Battle Model staff 
is not about their violation of rules, or the generation of more rules. Its 
focus is not legality, but workmanship.120  It accepts the reality that work, 
as designed and reflected in rules, is often not the same as the work as it 
must be performed, and it mobilizes operators’ pride in their work to 
help bolster their individual senses of accountability for a just collective 
outcome.  We expect our novices to simply follow the rules, but we 
expect our experts to deal with the unexpected, to innovate and 
improvise, even to ignore the rules when the situation demands it.121  As 
Egon Bittner has written, “at its core workmanship consists of the ability 
to call upon resources of knowledge, skill, and judgement to meet and 
master the unexpected within one’s sphere of competence.”122 The fact 
that there is no one to hang (or even that some individual has already 
been hung) for violating a pre-existing rule during a harmful event does 
not mean there is nothing to learn about improving workmanship.  
Discipline, prosecution, and civil damages will have to follow from 
specific particular violations in order to provide fair compensation and 
preserve public trust, but we do not have to stop there. 
There is a range of criminal justice errors including wrongful 
convictions, mistaken street stops, and avoidable uses of force for which 
the “Battle Model substratum” Griffiths identified will not want to see 
its participants punished, as long as their acts are “legal,” or perhaps 
unless they are flagrantly illegal.123  The Crime Control perspective 
generally accepts these errors as a cost of doing business.124  Still, the 
fact that there are law professors who can live contentedly with this 
utilitarian balancing of error costs does not prove that the people who 
actually work in criminal justice every day see these errors as desirable, 
nor want to repeat these outcomes if repetition can be avoided. 125  No 
one wants to play a role in convicting an innocent man and allowing the 
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real perpetrator to go free.  Likewise, no one wants to shoot a mentally 
ill civilian unnecessarily.   
Avoiding these outcomes whenever you can is a source of pride on 
the frontlines, and working daily to prevent them becomes a matter of 
self-respect.  Most criminal justice practitioners agree with James 
Reason’s statement of safety thinking, which accepts error as a part of 
the human condition:  “You cannot change the human condition, but you 
can change the conditions under which people work.”126  Changes to 
some work conditions will produce negligible results; changes to others 
are beyond the power of leadership.127  But there are some changes to 
working conditions that will have meaningful impact on operations that 
can be felt quickly:  these will improve the working lives of the people 
at the frontlines as well as the lives of their communities. 128 
By participating in collaborative learning reviews of unexpected 
outcomes, criminal justice practitioners can communicate that they 
accept that they “are accountable to the community for meeting even 
those standards of adequate workmanship that cannot be formulated in 
advance, and explicitly.”129  They can enhance public trust in the law and 
system legitimacy by showing that they care about getting things right.  
There are differences between medicine and criminal justice, of course, 
but there is reason to hope that the healing that patients and their families 
experience when medicine includes them in its “disclosure and 
apology”130 approach after a medical error can begin to be replicated for 
persons and communities harmed by criminal justice outcomes.  Persons 
harmed value their inclusion in efforts to see that no one else experiences 
their suffering in the future.131 
As things stand, the people most impacted by the justice system are 
least able to influence it.132  The safety approach could construct a 
participatory platform where the value we as a society give to safe 
workmanship—in a version of workmanship that gives due weight to the 
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benefits of systemization and standardization—can be expressed by 
taking account of its opposite, and of the right of community members 
to be free of unnecessary intrusions and curtailments.   
Orderly adjudications of disciplinary proceedings cannot be 
conducted as all-stakeholders colloquies.  In our existing processes, 
focused entirely on discipline and punishment, respect for the due 
process rights of the accused practitioner explains excluding, for 
example, civilian community representatives.  Learning-oriented 
reviews, on the other hand, provide a complementary avenue for the 
continuous community participation in criminal justice that can establish 
safety as a guiding principle, nourish interactions, build connections, 
cultivate young leaders, and create an environment where diversity and 
innovation can increase.133  These reviews will generate, mobilize, and 
apply data.  They will provide the “thick data” insights that complement 
the “big data” picture by accepting the complexity of events and 
revealing the social context of connections between data points.134  
These reviews will sometimes (although not always) generate answers 
to problems.  Perhaps most importantly, they will always generate new 
questions—questions from one stakeholder to another, and from the 
group of stakeholders to the relevant fields of inquiry—that can be 
subjected to empirical inquiry and detailed analysis.   
5. A SAFETY PLACE 
If this safety work is worth doing, where and how can it be done? 
 
The National Institute of Justice has been pursuing a methodical 
exploration of those questions since 2011.135  Focused on a core concept 
of non-blaming, all-stakeholders, all-ranks, forward-looking reviews of 
incidents and events, the NIJ Sentinel Events Initiative has conducted a 
diverse Roundtable of stakeholders,136 solicited and reported on three 
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“beta” site learning review efforts,137 convened community and 
“persons-harmed” sessions, and organized and disseminated the 
colloquies generated by an “all-stakeholders” gathering.138  It is now 
poised, in collaboration with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, to provide 
technical assistance (through the Quattrone Center for the Fair 
Administration of Justice) to state and local coalitions who will develop 
individualized versions of the learning review processes.139  The 
expectation is that a range of individualized adaptations will be 
developed, pursued, and evaluated. 
These efforts will likely take many forms, but the Betsy Lehman 
Patient Safety Center offers an analogy for criminal justice safety 
activities and suggests one straightforward and distinctly “doable” 
approach from the array of possibilities.140  It indicates that a place to do 
safety work is within reach for a quite modest investment.141   
The Betsy Lehman Center is a statewide agency with a small budget 
and a small professional staff.142  With an equivalent staff available, a 
state center for criminal justice safety (maintained, for example, at a state 
university) could, on request, provide jurisdictions with a neutral 
moderator, process expertise and substantive experts from event-
relevant fields.  It could manage documents and develop protocols for 
disseminating the event analyses generated by local participants, 
relieving smaller jurisdictions within a state of the need to maintain a 
standing review capacity locally. 
A version of the Betsy Lehman Center’s ability to afford 
confidentiality143 to participants could also be an important element of 
the development of the criminal justice system’s safety perspective, 
although perhaps not in the expected way. 
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It is easy to overstate the seriousness of the threat of increased civil 
liability for criminal justice harms as a substantive matter.  Many 
important learning events chosen for review (e.g., “near misses,” good 
catches) trigger no financial liability.  In others, (events that in medical 
cases would be classified as “closed claims”) the financial costs have 
already been realized, and logically can be treated as investments that 
ought to pay off in lessons to be learned.144  Beyond the choice of specific 
events for review, a variety of case specific devices, such as judicial 
protective orders and confidentiality agreements can be mobilized to 
provide sufficient event-specific protection in particular instances.  
These predictions are open to argument, of course, and the NIJ/BJA 
“demonstration projects” should shed further light on their accuracy, but 
there are indications that the liability concerns in terms of actual 
increased vulnerabilities will be marginal—something to be worked 
around, not a disqualification. 
Besides, as the heroic scholarship of Joanna Schwartz on police 
indemnification has shown, the public entities paying for the current 
event under review are in a position to benefit exponentially from 
enhancements to future safety.145  The best way to avoid liability is to 
avoid the harm, and in a context such as policing in which 99.98 
percent146 of money received by plaintiffs is paid from public funds, not 
the funds of the practitioners, the reduction in public risk from repeated 
harms should more than overbalance in policy terms any discomfort that 
the conduct of learning reviews instills.   
Even so, although liability concerns may in fact be outweighed by 
the benefits that safety perspective learning reviews promise, even 
mistaken concerns about liability remain significant in practical terms 
when they frighten stakeholders away from learning-oriented processes.   
Progress toward a safety perspective in criminal justice cannot be 
imposed from the top-down.  There is not, and there never can be, a 
criminal justice equivalent to the Joint Commission that imposes 
accreditation standards on hospitals, or the National Transportation 
Safety Board that compels transportation industry cooperation.  
Experience with generations of reform efforts shows that the highly 
localized and hyper-fragmented state of the criminal justice institutional 
environment that Malcolm Feeley identifies as a structural element of 
 
 144. See Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, supra note 9, at 1083. 
 145. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 
63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1181 (2016); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 885, 955 (2014). 
 146. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 145, at 955; see also John Rappaport, 
How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1547 (2017). 
 134 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
the design of the American system simply does not allow for the 
imposition of this sort of grand scheme.147 
If the Safety Model advances at all it will have to be by following 
the classic pattern of diffusion of innovations that Everett M. Rogers 
described, it will have to attract willing collaborators:  first followers, 
early adopters, an early majority, a late majority, and (eventually) 
laggards. 148  Because the learning reviews require all stakeholders’ 
perspectives to be fully effective, progress will require gathering groups 
of diverse collaborators in which every potential group member holds a 
veto.  Fears of liability augmentation, whether actual or used simply to 
cloak inertia and inchoate discomfort with novelty, can be a destructive 
inhibiting force.  Dealing with those inhibitions sooner rather than later, 
as in the Betsy Lehman Center authorizing legislation, is likely to be a 
productive strategy. 
In the end, barriers and inhibitions notwithstanding, safety is 
something everyone wants: for their communities, for their families, and 
for themselves.  It is valued by both the community and the criminal 
justice professionals across all of the criminal justice “silos.”  Safety-
oriented reviews will support an ongoing collaborative practice of 
questioning, explaining, and exploring.  If they are conducted by diverse 
professional and community stakeholders as equals, all working to make 
things safe, over time we can expect important learning, but we can also 
hope for healing. 
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